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Abstract:  
This study evaluates behavioural differences between union and non-union workers in their 
preferences regarding reciprocal loyalty in the employment relationship. It uses a vignettes 
approach to elicit preferences and a novel dataset with unusually rich information on semi-skilled 
employees from four European countries. It focuses on reciprocal employer-employee 
arrangements stating that if the employee exerts higher effort, the employer reciprocates by 
offering higher job security. Such reciprocal arrangements are found to be valued more highly by 
unionized workers. The evidence suggests that the norm-enhancing role of union membership is 
the key candidate explanation of this pattern. Union workers are also found more likely to 
exercise the ‘voice’ rather than the ‘exit’ option in their current job. 
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1. Introduction 
Human interaction and collective behaviour are often shaped by social norms, i.e. behavioural 
regularities that are based on a socially shared belief about how one ought to behave. Social 
norms are enforced by informal social sanctions (Akerlof, 1980; Fehr and Gächter, 1998). 
Furthermore, Hirschman (1982) suggests that institutions can induce specific behaviours which 
may finally become part of the behavioural profile of the individual. Such profiles may entail self-
centered, opportunistic, reciprocal and cooperative behaviour. Moreover, Dunlop (1944) 
suggests that “the institutionalized form of collective action may introduce new preferences in the same way the 
household modifies individual preferences”. In addition, “interaction patterns of a given form of collective action 
could alter preferences and in addition various forms of collective action can obviously affect the choice of the group 
even if preferences remain stable” (Duncan and Stafford, 1980). A key mechanism for the 
establishment of social norms and collective behaviour is reciprocity, particularly in 
environments where the relations and obligations are not governed by explicit agreements (Fehr, 
Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In some occasions, acquired 
preferences can be internalized and become constraints on behaviour (Ariely, Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 2003; 2006; Carpenter, 2005). 
The industrial relations literature, suggests that unionized workers exhibit distinct behavioural 
profiles. A prominent application is the loyalty-exit-voice framework. Hirschman (1970) explains 
why dissatisfied citizens do not leave their countries or dissatisfied customers a given product or 
firm. Freeman and Medoff (1984) apply this idea to workplace relations to show that unionized 
workers are more loyal to their employers than non-union workers. Their loyalty differs from 
unswerving faith to the firm and is more likely to be paternalistic1 and mediated by the union. 
Akerlof (1982) emphasized that loyalty is based on employer-employee reciprocity and points out 
that the concepts of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty can be expressed in terms of norms and gift 
exchange which are partially endogenously determined. He also notes that the analysis of labour 
contracts as partial gift exchange can relate to the view on trade unions as collective voice. 
However, Akerlof (1983) also explains value-changing processes that can bring about the 
endogenous emergence of loyalty, labeled as “loyalty filters”. 
The literature also shows that there may be a variable impact of workplace relations and 
management practices on performance in terms of output per worker (Katz, Kochan and 
Gobeille, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Harter, Schmidt and Hayes, 2002; Kleiner, Leonard 
                                                            
1 Paternalism has been described in the context of internal labour markets as the practice of building loyalty and 
fostering individual worker dependence on the employer as an alternative to financial incentives (Doeringer, 1986). 
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and Pilarski, 2002; Bartel, Freeman, et al., 2003. Furthermore, Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas 
(2008) provide evidence on expressions of negative reciprocity by unionized workers, in terms of 
output quality, defective production and formal complaints. It is shown that such punishment 
behaviour takes place when concessions are demanded during bargaining and when replacement 
workers are hired next to returning union workers.  
The above imply that union membership is related to particular types of social preferences, 
which involve both positive and negative expressions of reciprocity towards the employer, i.e. 
gift exchange and retaliation.  Unionised workers are more likely to exercise “voice” and raise 
their concerns or even reciprocate in a negative way. However, the negative expressions do not 
result in unionized workers utilising the option to “exit” an unpleasant situation and quit their 
job. The union literature provides ample empirical evidence regarding the voice and exit 
functions of unionised workers (Lewin, 2005). However, empirical evidence on the attribute of 
loyalty and its link to reciprocity is scarce (Cahuc and Kramarz, 1997).   
In view of the above, this paper investigates the preferences for arrangements involving 
reciprocity and mutual loyalty in the labour force. A dataset with very rich information on semi-
skilled employees from four European countries and conjoint analysis are employed. Conjoint 
analysis is essentially a stated preference technique which involves evaluation of hypothetical job 
scenarios. It is shown that the unionised workers exhibit a greater preference for reciprocal 
loyalty compared to their non-union counterparts. The evidence is consistent with a norm 
enforcing aspect of union membership and with the view that unionised workers are more likely 
to exercise the ‘voice’ rather than the ‘exit’ option.  
The structure of the remaining of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the dataset, and 
Section 3 reviews the literature background and the empirical strategy adopted. Section 4 discusses 
some methodological issues, Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 
concludes.   
 
2.  The Data  
 2.1 The Questionnaire, the Database and the Sample 
The data used in this study is part of the EPICURUS database, a multi-country project funded 
by the European Commission. The data was collected during the 4th quarter of 2004, in 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Identical 
questionnaires were administered in all countries and were translated in several rounds by native 
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speakers, experienced in survey design. Four European companies specializing in surveys were 
employed for the task. They reported no complains from the respondents or other problems 
associated with the survey. The questionnaires were administered to a homogenous group of 
individuals. The target group was unskilled/semi-skilled employees between the ages of 18 and 
65. The survey included only individuals with low or middle education (i.e. it excluded individuals 
with a 5 or 6 education level in the 1997 ISCED International Classification scale)2. Students, 
self-employed and employees in fishery and agriculture were also excluded. Around 1,000 
individuals per country were interviewed, with the exception of Greece (800), Spain and Finland 
(300), due to budgetary constraints. 
The dataset contains the essential demographic information and extensive information at the 
individual and the household level. A large number of questions address issues related to current 
and past job outcomes, job satisfaction and well-being. The second part of the questionnaire is 
designed to elicit workers preferences about jobs and job attributes. The definitions and 
summary statistics of the variables used are reported in the Appendix A3.  
Due to very high rates of unionisation in the Nordic and Scandinavian countries, and the small 
sample size in Spain, this study utilises the data from France, Greece, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. Thus, the sample used comprises of 3,817 individuals, 800 union members, 
and 3,017 non-union workers. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that the sample is fairly 
representative of the actual unionisation rate per country.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the means of selected variables for the union and non-union worker sub-sample, 
along with significance levels from a t-test of differences in the means. Moreover, Table A1 in 
appendix A presents all variable definitions and their means. It is shown that union workers are 
more likely to earn higher wages compared to non-union workers4. They are also more likely to 
be older, with more experience and job tenure, more likely to be male, in permanent jobs, in the 
public sector, in large firms, and more likely to have received some form of training during the 
last year. Moreover, union workers are more likely to be found in the industries of Public 
Administration and Defense, Health and Social Work, Transportation and Communications, 
Manufacturing and Utilities. They are also more likely to be found in Technical and Associate 
Professional occupations, Crafts and Related, Plant and Machine Operatives.  
                                                            
2 A posteriori analysis of background variables shows that the sample successfully represents the targeted population. 
3 An extensive analysis of the questionnaire and the obtained database is available from the authors on request and 
are also available in the reports to the European Commission (EPICURUS Project, 2004; 2005).  
4 Wages are divided by the purchasing power parity in each country.   
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the variables that are related to the perception of 
conditions at work which are relevant to the issues regarding the ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ functions in 
this paper. The levels of significance for mean differences between union and non-union 
workers are also displayed. Compared to non-union workers, unionised workers are less satisfied 
with their job overall, their relationship with the employer, and his/her behaviour, the work load 
and work tension, the level of stress, and the physical risk of the job. However, they are more 
likely to be satisfied with job security in terms of likelihood of job loss. Measures of job 
conditions such as the occurrence of work-related injuries and sicknesses reflect the ‘voice’ 
function. Union workers are more likely to report a work-related sickness or injury than their 
non union counterparts, although the number of individual injuries or illnesses reported does not 
differ significantly between those who have experienced such spells. Union workers are also 
more likely to find their job to be tiring, of low quality in terms of work environment, dangerous, 
and physically demanding5.  
The last row of Table 3 indicates that unionised workers are much less likely to report that they 
intend to quit their job compared to non-union workers, which is in contrast to the above 
differences in the “voiced” expressions of dissatisfaction. 34.6% of the employees report that 
they intend to quit their job6, 23% of the unionised workers and 38% of the non-unionised.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
2.2 The Vignette Questionnaire 
The second part of the questionnaire is designed to elicit preferences for job attributes utilising 
job vignettes that enable the use of a conjoint analysis approach. The main objective of conjoint 
analysis is to identify how individuals value the various attributes of a good or service, such as a 
job, a house, health care or the environment7.  This technique essentially involves four main 
steps. These are: (1) Identification of the relevant characteristics - attributes of the good to be 
evaluated; (2) Quantification – level assignment to the characteristics; (3) Design of scenarios 
(vignettes), as a combination of the former two steps; (4) Preference identification of the 
respondents, by ranking, rating, or discrete choice (Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000). Since 
                                                            
5 The differences in the summary statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3 are remarkably robust in each country sub-
sample. This feature and the homogeneity of the targeted population allowed the pooling of the data in one sample.  
6 The intention to quit is captured by the response “I will quit myself” to the question: “What would be the main reason to 
stop working with your current employer in your main job? 
7 The first studies using conjoint-analysis came from marketing research. There are several applications in economics 
(van Beek, Koopmans and van Praag, 1997; Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, van Praag and 
Theodossiou, 2007; van Soest, Delaney, et al., 2007; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2008, inter alia)   
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the number of scenarios increases with the number of characteristics and levels, not all of the 
scenarios generated can be included in a questionnaire as the respondents have a finite attention 
span. Thus, quasi-experimental designs are used to reduce the number to a convenient level. The 
selection of job attributes in the EPICURUS questionnaire is based on the literature and prior 
analysis of the determinants of perceived quality at work8.   
The approach followed assumes that a job j may be adequately described by a vector of n 
attributes na , contained in a job vignette. Thus, each vignette is defined by ten job attributes that 
were identified as highly important in determining the perception of quality at work. The 10 
attributes of each vignette are: (1) Net wage (as a percentage increase from the current wage); (2) 
type of contract (e.g., permanent or temporary); (3) working hours; (4) working times; (5) access 
to training opportunities; (6) work organization; (7) control over own work; (8) work intensity; 
(9) age of retirement; (10) and loyalty from the side of the firm and the side of the employee. The 
latter is discussed in detail in the next section.  
Respondents are asked to evaluate the vignettes on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the 
least and 10 the most satisfactory job9. Thus, the respondents are induced to trade off some 
characteristics for others and to incorporate the notion of opportunity cost into their decision-
making process.  Each respondent is asked to evaluate 5 hypothetical job offers (vignettes), 
involving different levels for each of the attributes. The respondents are also alerted to the fact 
that all other attributes of the hypothetical job are identical to their actual current job. Moreover, 
the values of the ten attributes are distributed at random, in order to eliminate the correlation of 
individual characteristics and vignette attributes. Orthogonality and large variance of the 
vignettes is ensured in the design phase. A typical vignette is reported in Figure 1. Table A2 in the 
Appendix presents the whole range of attributes along with their frequencies of occurrence. 
Differences in the frequency of all attributes between union and non-union workers are 
statistically insignificant, as ensured in the design phase (not shown).    
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A great benefit of this approach is its ability to yield multiple observations per respondent on 
hypothetical decision contexts. Of primary importance is that respondents understand, are 
committed to and can respond to the relevant hypothetical scenarios. Care is also taken to avoid 
                                                            
8 That analysis used available datasets for the countries in the sample, such as the European Community Household 
Survey (ECHP).   
9 Furthermore, they are asked to reply whether such a job would be acceptable by them. While the analysis in the 
next section uses vignette evaluation as a cardinalised continuous dependent variable, all findings in this paper are 
robust to the use of vignette acceptability as an alternative form of job evaluation.  
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any possible framing effects. For this reason nowhere in the vignette questionnaire is the union 
identity issue mentioned to respondents10.  
 
3. Background and Empirical Strategy 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest that unionised workers are more loyal to their employers 
compared to non-unionised employees. They suggest that as a result of organizational loyalty, 
union workers are less likely to quit in response to workplace conflict. They are also more likely 
to exercise ‘voice’, through formal and efficient dispute resolution arrangements. Unions provide 
their employees with a more effective voice to communicate their concerns, partly by promoting 
legitimacy at the workplace (Freeman, 1976; Freeman, 1980). Legitimacy is related to reciprocal 
employer-employee arrangements, mediated by the union (Doeringer, 1984).  
This study investigates the aspects related to the above literature as follows: First, it examines 
differences between union and non-union workers in the preference for reciprocal loyalty in the 
employment relationship. The empirical evidence on this attribute is scarce11. Preferences 
regarding various attributes of a job are elicited using conjoint analysis. One of the included job 
attributes is reciprocal employer-employee loyalty. This is conceptualised in the vignettes by 
offering two alternative options. Some of the vignettes describe jobs in which: “Loyalty from both 
sides (employer and employee) is required; shirking and low performance is impossible”, while the rest describe 
that “The firm requires no loyalty; shirking and low performance is possible”12.  
                                                            
10 A framing effect occurs when choices made under the influence of institutionally determined framing may later be 
repeated even in the absence of the framing effect if the effects of exposure to the object of choice, or dissonance 
reduction effects are strong (Bowles, 1998). In the general part of the questionnaire, there are only two questions 
related to unions regarding whether the individual is a member of the union and whether the employer accepts 
unions. For the typical respondent there is a ten minutes time interval between responding to the above questions 
and the evaluation of the vignettes in the second part of the questionnaire.  
11 As an exception, Cahuc and Kramarz (1997) empirically investigate a mechanism, where power is exchanged for 
loyalty, and where there is the delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers. This operation turns 
out to stabilize employment and decrease turnover in a similar fashion to efficiency wages. In a related empirical 
study, Boroff and Lewin (1997) define loyalty as organizational commitment or “the degree to which a person identifies 
with an organization”. They link loyalty to ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ functions of the trade union. However, their empirical 
study does not fully support the proposition that unionized workers are more loyal to their employers than non-
union workers. Other expressions of loyalty operationalized include: “giving private and public support to the organization” 
(Rusbult, Farrell, et al., 1988) and “organizational citizenship” (Cappelli and Rogovsky, 1998).  
12 The “Loyalty-No Shirking” attribute is explained to the respondent as follows:  “The firm treats you with the 
same norms as the other firms operating in the same labour market, except for the specific attributes mentioned 
above. Loyalty to your employer is required. Thus, you cannot get away with shirking (e.g. by taking longer coffee 
breaks than allowed, by working slowly) and low performance work. The employer has loyalty to you. Thus the 
employer will not fire you for the duration of your contract whatever its length (including lifetime contracts)”. The 
“No Loyalty-Shirking” attribute is also explained as: “The firm treats you with the same norms as the other firms 
operating in the same labour market, except for the specific attributes mentioned above. No loyalty to your 
employer is required. Thus, you can get away with shirking (e.g. by taking longer coffee breaks than allowed, by 
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This approach assumes that the utility a worker derives from a job stems from specific attributes 
that describe the job, rather than the job per se. It is a stated preference methodology rooted in 
the random utility theory (McFadden, 1973; Hanemann, 1984). The underpinnings of this 
approach originate in Lancaster (1966; 1971) and Rosen (1974). Thus, the stated utility from a 
job j:  
 )( jnj aUU   
where jna is a vector of n job characteristics describing a job j. Individuals are indifferent 
between two jobs 1 and 2, if )()(
'21 nn aUaU  . Knowledge of the function U(.) makes it possible 
to calculate trade-off ratios, defined as the extent to which an individual may accept less of one 
job characteristic when compensated by an increase in another characteristic, without the overall 
evaluation of a job being affected. Thus, the trade-off ratio between attributes 1 and 2 of a given 
job is: 
. 
2
1
j
j
a
U
a
U




 
The derived trade-off ratios provide a measure of the relative importance of a job attribute, such 
as ‘loyalty’ for the union and non-union workers.  
Second, the potential explanations for any differences in preferences for ‘loyalty’ between union 
and non-union workers are also investigated. A number of propositions can explain social 
preferences for reciprocal ‘loyalty’. In this study, three main propositions are investigated: (a) 
Reciprocal behaviour may be generated by an innate desire to be kind or hostile in response to 
kindness or hostility. This, along with perceptions of process-related justice (Fuller and Hester, 
2001) and relative concerns (Farber and Saks, 1980) can induce union formation and 
membership. (b) An appreciation of reciprocal arrangements can rise with exposure and 
experience, without a shift in tastes, in line with Stigler and Becker (1977). Moreover, in 
situations of repeated interaction with incomplete contracts, reputation can deter selfish 
behaviour. In this sense, the mediating role of the union and its ability to facilitate 
communication, information, and reputation can induce cooperative outcomes (Simon, 1951; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Ostrom, 1998). (c) The union can be thought to have a norm-
enforcing role to its members. Individuals may not be aware of some preferences, until they 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
working slowly) and low performance work. The employer has no loyalty to you. Thus the employer can fire you at 
any time and you can leave the job at any time too”.   
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experience a certain situation, in line with the notion of “coherent arbitrariness” (Ariely et al., 2003; 
2006)13. Membership in a social group can also transform individuals, leading to internalized 
roles, norms and values that affect behaviour (Akerlof, 1980; Booth, 1985; Bowles, 1998; Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000; Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2006). Finally, the dominance of a ‘trait’ in a 
group may enhance replication via ‘conformist’ behaviour and cognitive dissonance14, 
independently of the payoff to those exhibiting the ‘trait’.  
The empirical strategy used in this paper creates testable propositions of the above three sets of 
ideas. First, in order to account for self-selection into union status, an endogenous switching 
model of vignette evaluation is estimated. Second, in order to examine the exposure and 
repeated interaction explanation, interaction variables between the ‘loyalty’ attribute and variables 
for tenure, age and experience are introduced in the evaluation regressions. Positive interaction 
terms with these variables and the loyalty attribute would favour a repeated interaction 
explanation for the preference for loyalty. Finally, the norm enhancement proposition is 
examined by including interactions with recent unemployment experience, number of 
unemployment spells in the last year and firm size. Unemployment experience in the last year 
identifies new workers/union members. Furthermore, it can be thought of as a shock to 
cognitive dissonance. Employment in small firms where anonymity is less likely and interaction 
more common compared to larger firms can be thought to increase the conformist replication 
propensities of individuals.  
Finally, the study examines the ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ expressions of union and non-union workers. In 
the literature, loyalty is shown to be positively correlated with the exercise of ‘voice’ and 
negatively correlated with exit behaviour. Following Hersch and Stone (1990) the ‘voice’ 
function is related to the expressed job satisfaction15. The ‘exit’ function of workers is revealed 
by the worker’s intention to quit the firm in the near future. As it can be seen in the summary 
statistics presented at the previous section unionized workers are less likely to be satisfied with 
most aspects of their jobs, but they are also less likely to declare that they intend to quit their job 
                                                            
13 A relevant evolutionary view suggests that “cognitive adaptations for social exchange” can generate patterns of reciprocal 
behavior under the influence of environmental stimulae (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 
2000).  
14 Cognitive dissonance involves a situation where people are confronted with a phenomenon that conflicts with 
their previously held beliefs, thus creating internal pressure for an after-the-fact rationalization of the unexpected 
phenomenon (Festinger, 1957). In Akerlof and Dickens (1982), individuals choose their beliefs and then process 
information to reinforce those beliefs. 
15 Most of the literature interprets the lower job satisfaction of unionized workers as ‘voice’. A different view would 
question whether job satisfaction as expressed in surveys, is the same as that expressed to managers and supervisors. 
An alternative measure of ‘voice’ is the incidence of formal grievances. However, job satisfaction and grievances are 
found to be negatively related and the empirical evidence indicates that the grievance rates of non-union workers are 
half of that of union workers (Lewin, 2005). A measure of grievance is not available in our dataset.   
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in the near future. Four possible reasons are offered in the literature pertaining to explain the 
relative dissatisfaction among the union workers (Borjas, 1979; Duncan and Stafford, 1980; 
Kochan and Helfman, 1981; Hersch and Stone, 1990). First, there may be a flatter wage-tenure 
profile in the union sector. Second, compensating differentials may give rise to a union premium 
for less favourable working conditions. Third, there may be an outcome of a reverse causation in 
the relationship between unionization and job satisfaction. Finally, the lower job satisfaction of 
union workers may be an expression of the exit-voice mechanism. As a byproduct of loyalty, 
union workers are more likely to express dissatisfaction rather than seek for employment 
elsewhere. Thus, their dissatisfaction is not genuine in the sense that it does not lead to quits, but 
it is instead a device through which the expressed dissatisfaction of the unionized workers can 
offer arguments to strengthen the trade union case in its negotiation with the employer for 
achieving more favourable terms of employment. The strategy adopted aims to exclude the 
explanations of long tenure, compensating differentials and reverse causality. Finally, voice is 
linked to the exit behaviour and the main hypothesis examined suggests that ceteris paribus, 
unionized workers will be less likely to quit their jobs.  
 
4.  Methodological Issues 
4.1 The COLS Approach for Ordinal Dependent Variables 
The empirical approach followed in this study is to assume that an individual i’s latent evaluation 
of a job j, ijU , depends on the values of the job’s n attributes, jna , as specified in the vignettes, 
and on k individual and current job characteristics, denoted by kX . Hence:  
);( kjniij XaUU  (1) 
Since individuals evaluate each job vignette on a discrete scale from 0 to 10, their true evaluation 
is a latent variable, i.e. its true value is not observed exactly. The observed evaluation U* is an 
ordered categorical variable. In the empirical equivalent of (1), if it is assumed that *ijU is a linear 
function of the n attributes, the k individual characteristics, and a random error term, i , then:  
 ijiknijij XaU   ,* (2) 
However, cardinal evaluations facilitate the computation of the trade-off ratios between the 
attributes. Hence, in this study, *ijU  is transformed by linearising the ordinal evaluation 
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responses. The methodology adopted is the Cardinal OLS (COLS) approach (van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, Ch. 2). This assumes that respondents are supplying a cardinal 
evaluation, but it takes into account that they are unable to give precise information about their 
evaluation, due to the categorical format of the response scale. Thus, any observed value of the 
discrete variable *ijU  represents a transformation of the latent evaluation ijU  belonging to one of 
the intervals: [0, 0.5], (0.5, 1], …, (9.5, 10]. Normalizing the scale to the [0, 1]-interval, the COLS 
approach replaces the inexactly known value of ijU by its conditional expectation ijU , according 
to the following formula (Maddala, 1983, p.366): 
)()(
)()()|(
1
1
1


 

nn
nn
nijnijij NN
nn
UUEU 
  (3) 
where n(.) and N(.) stand for the normal density and distribution functions, respectively, and λ 
takes its values in {0, 0.05, 0.15, …, 0.95, 1}.   
After the observed evaluation of the vignette is transformed into the conditional mean of the 
latent evaluation, OLS can be applied to the transformed linear model:  
ijiknijij XaU   ,*  (4) 
where εi is a symmetric error term with mean zero.  COLS is shown to yield consistent 
parameter estimates (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), identical to those obtained by 
ordered probit (except for a factor of proportionality), as efficient as probit estimates (Stewart, 
1983), but computationally much easier.  
The examination of vignette evaluation requires the creation of a pseudo-panel, based on the 5 
consecutive responses by each individual to the vignettes. Hence, taking into account the 
probable correlation structure between the five individual vignette evaluations, the error term εij 
is decomposed into an individual-specific effect θi  and a white noise component ζij, where 
E(ζij)=0 and  E(θi, ζij)=0. Both fixed-effects and random-effect models are utilized in the analysis 
of the vignette evaluation. However, the random-effects model has the advantage of allowing the 
incorporation of controls for individual and current job characteristics that are invariant across 
responses, such as gender, education etc. This model also allows the inclusion of interaction 
terms between the loyalty attribute and individual characteristics of intuitive interest. The 
equivalent of (4) is estimated for union and non-union workers, by fixed effects, then after 
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incorporating individual characteristics by random effects, and finally by controlling for 
endogenous switching into union membership.  
4.2 Selection into Union Status 
Estimating versions of equation (4) is subject to an endogenous sample selection issue, as long as 
the unobserved determinants of union membership are correlated with unobservables in the 
vignette evaluation equations. Thus, estimates for union and non-union workers are also 
presented after self-selection in union membership is taken into account. This is accomplished 
via using a Heckman-type endogenous switching model (Heckman, 1978; 1979; Lee, 1978; 
Maddala, 1983). The model takes into account the latent propensity of an individual to become a 
member of a trade union, as follows:   
  imniji XaS ,* (5) 
where S indicates union membership and ω is a normally distributed error term, with  
E(Xi, ω)=0. At least one variable in X must be identifying the selection equation, while excluded 
from the evaluation equation (4), i.e. k≤m. The modified version of equation (4) that controls for 
endogenous union status is then estimated for union and non-union workers separately via 
maximum likelihood. This is an efficient estimator that allows for robust standard errors, 
clustered at the individual level.  
 
5.  Results and Discussion  
 5.1 The Impact and Nature of the Reciprocal Loyalty Attribute 
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of vignette evaluation, for the samples of union and 
non-union employees respectively. The coefficients and standard errors of the wage attribute and 
the loyalty attribute are displayed, along with a point estimate and standard error for the trade-off 
ratio between wages and loyalty. The latter reflects the wage compensation that the average 
worker would require in exchange for the loss of the employer-employee loyalty. Table B1 in the 
appendix B provides estimates for the whole range of attributes. In both tables, Panel (A) 
presents estimates from a COLS model with fixed-effects. Panel (B) displays estimates from a 
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COLS model with random effects that includes control variables for individual and work-related 
characteristics16.  
The results in Table 4 reveal an interesting and persistent pattern. The effect of the loyalty 
attribute is much higher for the sample of union workers compared to the non-union ones. The 
wage compensation required for the loss of loyalty is consistently close to 18% of the current 
wage for union workers and close to 11% for non-union workers17. The ratios suggest that 
unionized workers would have to be compensated by at least 50% more than non-union workers 
in order to give up the employer-employee loyalty in a job. The figures are 51.8% in the fixed-
effects models, and 57.4% in the random effects model. The latter model also controls for the 
current wage level among the observables. A Wald χ2 test for the difference between the two 
coefficients, equal to 
22
2
11
)..()..(
)(
11
NUU ESES
NUU



 , reveals statistical significance at the 1% level for the 
difference in the loyalty attribute, and the trade-off ratios.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The results in panels A and B of Table 4 suggest that the employer-employee loyalty is valued 
more highly by union workers compared to their non-union counterparts. However, such 
preferences might be formed ex-ante i.e. they might be valued by the individual before he/she 
joins the union. Alternatively, they might be induced or strengthened ex-post due to membership 
in a trade union which mediates for such arrangements and hence, internalized via adaptation. 
The persistence of the higher effect of the loyalty attribute in the union sample after accounting 
for self selection may be interpreted as in favour of ex-post adaptation.  
A model which allows for endogenous switching into union status is estimated in order to 
investigate this issue. Panel (C) of Table 4 presents the results of interest from a COLS model with 
a Heckman correction for selection into union status. The detailed results are presented in Table 
B2 in the Appendix B. The identifying variables in the selection equation are 1-digit industry 
codes. A Wald χ2 test with 14 degrees of freedom indicates that all identifying restrictions used 
are insignificant in predicting vignette evaluation for both sub-samples (shown in the bottom of 
Table B2). They are jointly significant in the selection equation. Furthermore, a Lagrange 
                                                            
16 A Breusch-Pagan test for random effects at the bottom of Table B1 rejects the null hypothesis of non-significance 
of the random unobserved individual component. A Hausman χ2 test with 25 degrees of freedom, comparing the 
fixed effects model specification of Panel (A) with the respective specification in the context of a random effects 
model suggests the random effects model would be consistent and efficient for the union sample. However, it 
would be inconsistent for the non-union sample. Thus, both models are used.  
17 The loyalty/wage ratios and their standard errors are obtained as point estimates for the nonlinear combination of 
the parameter estimates for the loyalty and wage attributes.  
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multiplier (LM) test showing whether the industry dummy variables should be included in the 
evaluation equations is used. The LM tests for union and non-union workers are not significant 
at conventional levels. This tentatively suggests that the restrictions for identifying the selection 
effects are adequate. Finally, a Wald test accepts the independence of the two equations and thus 
the model can be consistently estimated with COLS. The estimation results, after controlling for 
endogenous switching into the union, show that the difference in the impact of the loyalty 
attribute between union and non-union workers persists. Union members need to be 
compensated by 62% more than non-unions workers in order to accept forgoing the loyalty 
attribute. The difference in the coefficients and trade-off ratios between union and non-union 
members is significant at the 1% level18.  
The higher impact of the loyalty attribute among union workers is further investigated by 
incorporating interaction terms between this attribute and individual characteristics of intuitive 
interest in the random effects model of vignette evaluation. First, interactions with tenure, age 
and experience are included, in order to examine whether the higher impact of the loyalty 
attribute arises due to exposure and repeated interaction. Panels (A), (B), and (C) of Table 5 
present the results of these estimations. All three interaction terms between the loyalty attribute 
and the logarithms of job tenure, age, and experience in the labour market exert an insignificant 
impact on the evaluation of a job. These interaction terms are statistically insignificant for both 
union and non-union workers. These results suggest that the higher preference for the loyalty 
attribute, observed among unionised workers is not due to more years of tenure or experience in 
the firm. 
In panel (D) of Table 5, an interaction term between the loyalty attribute and unemployment 
experience during the last year is included. This unemployment experience-loyalty interaction 
term exerts a large negative impact on the evaluation of a job only for union workers but it is 
insignificant for the non-union workers. Thus, unemployment has a negative impact in the 
loyalty of unionised workers only. Recent unemployment experience might be expected to 
identify new union membership or alternatively serve as a negative shock to worker loyalty if that 
loyalty is the outcome of cognitive dissonance. Such a shock can be thought to give rise to 
motives of retaliation. This is consistent with the evidence of retaliatory acts by returning union 
workers during strikes and the hiring of replacement workers (Krueger and Mas, 2004; Mas, 
                                                            
18 In order to examine the robustness of the findings, vignette acceptability is examined as an alternative form of job 
evaluation. The results are available upon request and indicate that the difference in the impact of the loyalty 
attribute is robust. It bears a higher weight in the acceptability of a vignette among union workers compared to non-
union employees. The trade-off ratios between wages and loyalty are also significantly higher for union workers and 
their magnitude is very similar to those in Table 4.  
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2008). Moreover, in panel (E) an interaction term between the loyalty attribute and the logarithm 
of weeks in unemployment during the last year is incorporated in the specification. The results 
suggest that the more the weeks in unemployment the smaller is the impact of the reciprocal 
loyalty attribute for the unionised workers. On, the contrary, non-union workers with more 
weeks in unemployment in the last year give a slightly higher valuation to jobs that involve 
loyalty. The results in these last two panels favour the explanation of adaptation to reciprocal 
arrangements by union workers due to cognitive dissonance. A shock to the latter gives rise to 
negative reciprocity.  
Finally, estimates of an interaction term between the loyalty attribute and employment in a small 
firm (between 1 and 10 employees) are presented in panel (F). The results show that the 
interaction between loyalty and employment in a small firm has a positive impact, significant at 
the 10% level among non-union workers. The impact is large but insignificant among the union 
sample. This result may be interpreted as evidence on the “loyalty filtering” role of the labour 
union. In small firms, where the communication between the employer and workers is easy 
without any third part mediation (such as a trade union), the appreciation of loyalty is high 
among both union and non-union workers. In such settings anonymity is lower and 
communication is easier. In small firms workers are more likely to know their employer 
personally compared to large firms, and thus the environment is conducive to workers 
identifying with the firm. Replication and conformist transmission of a ‘trait’ is also more likely 
to arise in a small firm without third party mediation. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The above results suggest that reciprocal arrangements involving loyalty are valued more highly 
by union workers, and this finding is not the outcome of self-selection and/or repeated 
interaction. The empirical tests presented favour the explanation of adaptation to such 
arrangements due to cognitive dissonance and conformist transmission. The next sections 
examine the voice and exit behaviour of workers in their current job. First, differences between 
unionised and non unionised workers in ‘voice’ expressions mirrored in the reported job 
satisfaction are examined. Second, differences between these groups in the intention to quit the 
job and its determinants are studied.  
 5.2 The Exit-Voice Function 
The summary statistics of Table 3 have suggested that union workers are less satisfied with their 
jobs on average, compared to non-union employees. In this section, the potential explanations of 
this finding are examined using regression analysis. Hence, Table 6 presents COLS estimates 
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from job satisfaction regressions. Coefficients and standard errors are reported. The list of 
explanatory variables includes the logs of PPP adjusted monthly wage rate, and hours of work, 
union membership, a vector of personal and job characteristics (gender, cohabitation/marriage 
status, and the log of the number of children aged less than 16) and a vector of work-related 
characteristics (firm-size, sector of activity, log of tenure, experience, permanent job, training 
during the last year, occupation (1-digit)). Column (1) presents estimates from a standard job 
satisfaction regression, in which no explicit working conditions are accounted for. In accordance 
with the literature, unionised workers are less satisfied with their job overall, ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient is -0.095, statistically significant at the 1% level. Job tenure is negatively related to job 
satisfaction. The wage rate and experience, marital status, training and the permanent contract 
are positively related to job satisfaction but being a male worker has a negative effect on job 
satisfaction. The education turns out to be insignificant which is expected, since the survey 
targets the low-skilled, with low levels of education. Finally, civil servants appear to draw the 
highest job satisfaction from their job compared to the other four occupational categories.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Then, Column 2 presents a specification that examines whether the difference in job satisfaction 
can be explained by the higher tenure of unionised workers which is also shown in Table 2.  
Hence, an interaction term between the log of job tenure and union membership is introduced. 
Job satisfaction is U-shaped in job tenure, as revealed by the negative coefficient of the log of 
tenure. The coefficient of the interaction term is small, positive, and statistically insignificant. 
The effect of union status is marginally insignificant at the 10% level when the interaction term is 
included. However, the magnitude of the coefficient increases. This is an indication that the high 
job tenure alone can not explain the lower job satisfaction of unionised workers.  
The alternative explanation of the lower job satisfaction of union members compared to non-
union workers is that although the former enjoy higher wages, these reflect compensating 
differentials for jobs of lower quality and unfavourable working conditions. Columns 3 and 4 
investigate this explanation. In Column 3, two additional variables which account for work 
conditions namely, the log of number of work related injuries and illnesses during the past two 
years that caused the employee to take at least one day off-work are introduced in the job 
satisfaction regression. Interestingly, both variables exhibit a negative impact on job satisfaction 
but their inclusion does not reduce the magnitude of the union and the wage effect19. Yet, union 
workers report a greater incidence of work-related illnesses and injuries compared to the non 
                                                            
19 As another test, interaction terms between injury/illness rates and union membership were introduced. The effect 
of the interaction terms was statistically insignificant. Results are available upon request.  
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unionized ones. Overall, this might be interpreted as evidence that although work-related injuries 
and illnesses do reduce job satisfaction, they are not sufficient to explain neither the lower job 
satisfaction nor the higher wages of union workers. To further examine the compensating 
differentials explanation the approach of Hersch and Stone (1990) is used which amounts to add 
in the regression the working condition variables that are identified by Duncan and Stafford 
(1980) as most important in explaining the union wage premium. The variables introduced 
capture whether the employee performs machine operation, the effort at work, and the ability of 
the employee to put own ideas into practice at work20. Column 4 shows that former two variables 
are negatively related to job satisfaction, while freedom to put own ideas in practice exerts a 
positive impact. The inclusion of the three variables reduces the magnitude of both the union 
status and wage coefficients. However, the negative union status coefficient remains significant. 
The interpretation is that the compensating differentials explanation is also not sufficient to 
account for the lower job satisfaction reported by the union members. Overall, the above results 
suggest that union membership has an impact on job satisfaction that is independent of wages 
and working conditions.  
As a third explanation, the reverse causality between job satisfaction and union membership is 
examined in Table 7. This reports results from the analysis of the membership-satisfaction link 
conducted using propensity score matching. Consistency of the effects estimated with propensity 
scores hinges upon the assumption that selection into union membership is captured by 
observables. However, unlike regression techniques, it computes the differential within the 
‘common support’, i.e. by comparing members and non-members that are similar with respect to 
observable attributes (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). Regression analyses use functional form 
assumptions to project the differential outside the common support, potentially biasing the 
results (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Therefore, it seems important to look at the membership 
satisfaction puzzle within the common support. The estimate shown is the effect of treatment on 
the treated for the whole sample, i.e. the mean difference in satisfaction across members and 
their matched non-member counterparts. The first panel uses nearest neighbour matching, while 
the second panel a kernel-based matching (the latter requires bootstrapped standard errors based 
on 100 replications). The matching estimates tend to corroborate the regression analysis in Table 
                                                            
20 The variables introduced are: (1) MACHINE: a categorical variable equal to 1 for workers who state that the 
speed of machine or assembly line is very important or the most important factor for the amount of effort they put 
in their job; (2) INTENSITY: an index in the [0, 1] interval, created as a summation of workers’ stated opinion for 
the intensity of the factors that make their job hard. Replies ranged from 1 to 5, and the options were: (a) high speed 
or high rhythm, (b) tight deadlines, (c) relationship with the boss or supervisor, (d) colleagues or co-workers. Thus, 
the index is 0 for a worker for whom none of these factors make his/her job hard, and 1, for a worker for whom all 
of these factors make it tough; (3) IDEAS: equal to 1 if the employee is frequently, nearly always or always allowed 
to put own ideas into practice at work. 
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6. Importantly, the results confirm the earlier findings i.e. the lower job satisfaction among union 
members. In both Panels of Table 7, union membership exhibits a negative and statistically 
significant effect, similar in magnitude to that of Table 6. This confirms the earlier analysis, 
though one should bear in mind that the parameter of interest is different.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Finally, the exit-voice tradeoff as an explanation of the lower job satisfaction that results from 
the higher loyalty of union workers is investigated. One should surmise that if union workers 
report genuinely lower job satisfaction compared to their non-union counterparts then this 
should be reflected on their intention to quit the current job. Using an approach similar to 
Hersch and Stone (1990), logit estimates of the determinants of the intention to quit are 
presented in Table 8. The regressors are union status, job satisfaction, wages, and a set of 
personal and work characteristics. Column 1 presents the estimates for the whole sample, where 
an interaction term between union status and job satisfaction is also introduced. Columns 2 and 3 
present the results for the union and non-union workers respectively. The coefficients, robust 
standard errors, and the respective marginal effects are reported. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
For the whole sample, the coefficient of union membership is negative, statistically significant, 
and large. The marginal effect is -0.133, indicating the union membership reduces quitting 
intentions by 13.3%. The magnitude of the effect is large, comparable to that of an individual 
having a permanent contract. Job satisfaction exerts a negative impact on the propensity to quit. 
The marginal effect is -0.044, significant at the 1% level. Thus, an increase of job satisfaction 
from approximately 6 to 8 (½ standard deviations below the mean to ½ standard deviations 
above the mean) reduces the propensity to quit by 4.4%. The coefficient of the interaction 
between union status and job satisfaction is insignificant, suggesting that the lower job 
satisfaction of unionized workers does not increase their quitting propensity. In the separate 
estimates by union status in Columns 2 and 3, the marginal effect of job satisfaction is -0.024 for 
unionized workers and -0.047 for non-union workers. Both effects are statistically significant at 
the 1% level, and the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant (Wald 
χ2 test=0.23). Thus, the results suggest that unions do lead to greater expressions of 
dissatisfaction among union workers, even when objective measures of job characteristics are 
held constant, but this dissatisfaction does not lead to increased chances of quitting compared to 
non-union workers.  
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This study discusses employment relation outcomes that are likely to result from adaptation to 
union-mediated cooperation. It first evaluates the prevalence of a particular type of social 
preferences, namely for reciprocity in the employment relationship. Differences between 
unionised and non-unionised workers are examined using a unique database with rich 
information on low-skilled workers from four European countries. The evidence links the 
loyalty-exit-voice conjecture to differences in preferences for employer-employee reciprocity by 
union and non-union workers. The empirical investigation suggests that these differences are 
enforced by union mediation. The evidence suggests union workers exhibit a significantly higher 
preference for reciprocal arrangements in an employment relationship that is based on employer-
employee loyalty. In this paper the employer-employee arrangement is that higher effort is 
exchanged for a more stable employment relationship and job security provisions. The results are 
robust when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous union membership and age, 
tenure and experience effects.  
The results also suggest a higher likelihood of negative reciprocity expressions by unionised 
workers compared to their non unionised counterparts. Unionised workers who recently 
experience unemployment spells are less likely to consider loyalty as important compared to 
established union members with uninterrupted employment. Furthermore, the results show a 
“loyalty filtering” role of the labour union. In small firms where the communication between the 
employer and workers is easy to occur without any third part mediation, the prevalence of a 
loyalty preference is equally likely to arise among union or non union workers. Finally, the loyalty 
observation is compatible with the exit and voice functions that have been extensively examined 
in the literature. Union workers express greater dissatisfaction with most facets of their current 
job. This lower job satisfaction can not be explained by high tenure, compensating differentials, 
or reverse causality of union membership. However, unionised workers are less likely to intend 
to quit their jobs, consistent with their aforementioned loyalty observation. The impact of job 
satisfaction on job quit intension is consistent with the exit-voice explanation of the lower job 
satisfaction of union workers.   
Overall, the evidence indicates that unionised workers are more likely to value reciprocal loyalty 
more highly as a desirable job attribute. Their appreciation of this attribute is also more likely to 
be affected by a shock such as recent unemployment experience. The evidence highlights 
cognitive dissonance and conformist transmission as the key candidate explanations of this 
persistent pattern. Reciprocity is a key mechanism for the enforcement of social norms and the 
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enhancement of collective action in environments where the relations and obligations are not 
governed by explicit agreements. Economic institutions can induce specific behaviours and often 
acquired preferences can be internalized and become constraints on behaviour.  
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Figure 1 
Typical Vignette 
 
Imagine that, for some reason, you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new one.  
Imagine that after a short time you get several offers.  We will list them on the following screen.  These listed 
job offers do not differ from your current job except for some points we specifically mention.  
 
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the 
best possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?” 
Wage: 20 % more than now per hour 
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay 
Working hours: 20 hours a week
Working times: Rotating shift system
Training 
opportunities: 
The employer will offer you a 10-workday training program in the course of the 
year 
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team
Work conditions: No one controls your work
Work speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to work 
at high speed 
Retirement: You can retire at age 55
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms. No loyalty from both sides. Shirking 
and low performance is possible 
  
  
‐ How would you rate this offer? …… Please, evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst 
possible and 10 the best possible job 
 
‐ Would this job offer be acceptable to you?.......... Yes/No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
The Sample 
 
 EPICURUS DATA OFFICIAL 
STATISTICS[a] 
Sample Size Union  
Workers 
Non-Union 
Workers 
% Union  
Members 
France 1,008 12.6% (127) 87.4% (881) 8.0% 
Greece 800 22.9% (183) 77.1% (617) 20.0% 
Netherlands 1,007 28.4% (286) 71.6% (711) 25.0% 
United Kingdom 1,002 19.4% (194) 82.6% (808) 29.0% 
Pooled Sample  3,817 800 3,017 21.0% 
 
 [a] Source: European Commission, 2006,  p.25.  
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Table 2 
Selected Summary Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
 
 UW NUW UW NUW 
   Occupation:   
Individual Characteristics:   Managers 2.0% 3.2%* 
Male 64.0%*** 45.0% Professional 2.6% 2.0% 
Age 42.21*** 36.36 Technical & Assoc. Prof.  12.5%* 10.3% 
Experience 24.18*** 18.30 Clerical & Secretarial 21.6% 26.1%** 
Tenure 14.22*** 8.04 Craft & Related Trades 4.5%* 3.1% 
    - 1-2 years 8.8% 25.7%*** Personal & Protective Service 5.0% 4.1% 
   - 3-5 years 17.3% 28.1%*** Labouring in mining, construction,  5.6% 4.6% 
   - 5-10 years 19.0% 20.2% manufacturing & transport   
   - More than 10 years 55.0%*** 26.0% Sales and Services 8.3% 17.8%***
Permanent contract 90.4%*** 83.3% Plant & Machine Operators and  Assemblers 7.1%*** 2.7% 
Training in last year 42.8%*** 35.2% Armed Forces 2.9%* 1.9% 
Net Monthly Wage 1,751*** 1,547 Other Occupations 27.9%** 24.2% 
   S.D. ( Net Monthly Wage) (851) (1,516) Industry:   
Weekly Hours of Work 35.8*** 34.8 Mining & Quarrying 0.0% 0.1% 
   S.D. (Hours) (7.7) (9.2) Utilities 3.0%*** 1.0% 
   Manufacturing 8.6%* 6.8% 
Sector:    Construction 6.1% 5.0% 
Private 41.3% 65.7%*** Trade & Repairs 6.4% 15.8%***
Non-Profit  9.5% 8.0% Hotels & Restaurants 2.0% 4.6%*** 
Civil Service 31.1%*** 14.4% Transport, Storage &  Communication 10.4%*** 6.8% 
Public Sector 18.1%*** 11.9% Financial Intermediation 3.1% 4.6%* 
   Real Estate & Business 0.6% 1.7%** 
Firm Size:    Other Services 10.8% 11.4% 
- 1-10 employees 10.0% 24.7%*** Public Administration & Defence 15.4%*** 7.4% 
- 10-24 employees 9.8% 15.4%*** Education 3.9% 4.0% 
- 25-99 employees 21.6% 20.7% Health and Social Work 11.6%* 9.5% 
- 100-499 employees 28.9%*** 18.3% Community, Social and  Personal Service 5.3% 4.0% 
- More than 500 employees 29.8%*** 21.0% Private Households 0.0% 1.0%*** 
   Extra-Territorial Org.  0.4% 0.8% 
   Other Activities 12.5% 15.6%** 
      
Notes:  p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01: From a t-test of mean differences between union and non-union workers. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Sample Averages and Mean Differences between Union and Non-Union Workers 
 
 UW NUW UW NUW 
Satisfaction with:   Finds job to be:    
Job Overall 6.73 6.79*** Tiring 70.6%*** 63.0% 
Promotion Prospects 4.11 4.29 Of low environ. quality 56.5%*** 45.6% 
Total Pay 5.14** 5.06 Dangerous 47.0%*** 32.5% 
Relations with Boss 6.60 6.92** Physically demanding 34.0% 28.8% 
Job Security 7.00** 6.85 Incidence of injury 17.5%*** 12.2% 
Use of Initiative 6.47 6.80 Incidence of illness 26.8%*** 19.9% 
The Work Itself 6.83 7.04 No. of Injuries (≠0) 1.88 1.80 
Hours of Work 6.84*** 6.79 No. of Illnesses (≠0) 2.94 2.64 
Times of Work 6.66 6.92 Other Characteristics:     
Employer's Behaviour 5.78 6.47*** Unemployment in last year 5.3% 12.3%*** 
Work Load 5.78 6.21* Weeks Unemployed t-1 ((≠0)) 13.7 17.9* 
Work Tension 5.33 5.81** Propensity to Quit 23.3% 37.6*** 
Level of Job Stress 5.10 5.61* Vignette Evaluation 3.81 4.06*** 
Physical Risk 5.88 6.64*** Vignette Acceptability 28.5% 30.9%*** 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01: From a t-test of mean differences between union and non-union workers.  
 
Table 4 
Vignette Evaluation 
Conjoint Analysis Selected Coefficients* and Trade-Off Ratios 
 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Vignette Evaluation COLS with Fixed Effects COLS with Random Effects  
& Individual Characteristics 
Endogenous Switching 
Heckman ML 
 
UW NUW 
Wald χ2  
test 
UW NUW
Wald χ2  
test 
UW NUW 
Wald χ2  
test 
v(WAGE)                         1.005***    1.071*** 1.73*    1.019***    1.091*** 0.10 1.014*** 1.095*** 1.75** 
                                       [0.044]    [0.024]      [0.046]    [0.025]    [0.054] [0.029]  
v(LOYALTY)                  0.174***    0.122*** 2.16**    0.184***    0.126*** 2.56*** 0.186*** 0.124*** 2.72*** 
                                       [0.031]    [0.017]      [0.032]    [0.017]    [0.033] [0.018]  
Loyalty/Wage Ratio    0.173***    0.114*** 2.59***    0.181***    0.115*** 3.24*** 0.183*** 0.113*** 3.25*** 
                                       [0.033]    [0.016]      [0.033]    [0.016]    [0.035] [0.017]  
          
# Observations             3,923 14,793  3,522 13,109  3,522 13,265  
# Individuals  794 2,992  712 2,650  712 2,653  
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Analytical results from full specifications are provided in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. 
Loyalty/Wage Ratio provides a point estimate and standard error from non-combination of the loyalty and wage attribute estimates 
is equal to 1. Finally, the Wald χ2 test is of the form 
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Table 5 
Conjoint Analysis Interaction Effects 
Vignette Evaluation; COLS with Random Effects 
 
Interaction with: (A) 
Log(Tenure) 
(B) 
Log(Age) 
(C) 
Log(Experience) 
 UW NUW UW NUW UW NUW 
v(WAGE)    1.019***    1.089***    1.019***    1.090***    1.020***    1.091*** 
                                                           [0.046]     [0.025]    [0.046]     [0.025]    [0.046]     [0.025]    
v(LOYALTY)    0.180**     0.155*** 0.226 0.108    0.292**     0.087*   
                                                           [0.072]     [0.028]    [0.370]     [0.167]    [0.135]     [0.050]    
LTENURE                                           -0.024 -0.013 - - - - 
                                                           [0.031]     [0.015]       
LTENURE*v(LOYALTY) 0.002 -0.018 - - - - 
                                                           [0.028]     [0.014]       
LNAGE  - - -0.164   -0.208*** - - 
                                                             [0.112]     [0.051]     
LNAGE*v(LOYALTY) - - -0.011 0.005 - - 
                                                             [0.099]     [0.047]     
LEXPERIENCE - - - - -0.060   -0.090*** 
                                                               [0.048]     [0.019]    
LEXPERIENCE*v(LOYALTY) - - - - -0.035 0.015 
                                                               [0.043]     [0.018]    
    
# Observations 3,522 13,129 3,522 13,129 3,522 13,109 
# Individuals  712 2,654 712 2,654 712 2,650 
                                                             
Interaction with: 
(D) 
Unemployment experience
in last year 
(E) 
Log(Weeks Unemployed) 
in last year 
(F) 
Employment in a small firm
 UW NUW UW NUW UW NUW 
v(WAGE)    1.019***    1.090***    1.019***    1.090***    1.021***    1.091*** 
                                                           [0.046]     [0.025]    [0.046]     [0.025]    [0.046]     [0.025]    
v(LOYALTY)    0.195***    0.122***    0.195***    0.118***    0.174***    0.111*** 
                                                           [0.033]     [0.018]    [0.033]     [0.018]    [0.033]     [0.019]    
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.108 0.046 - - - - 
                                                           [0.121]     [0.041]       
UNEMPLOYMENT*v(LOYALTY)   -0.196*   0.031 - - - - 
                                                           [0.113]     [0.042]       
LWEEKSUNEMP - - 0.041 -0.006 - - 
    [0.053]     [0.016]     
LWEEKSUNEMP*v(OYALTY) - -   -0.100**     0.028*  - - 
                                                             [0.049]     [0.016]     
FIRM1_10  - - - - -0.036   -0.053*   
                                                               [0.089]     [0.032]    
FIRM1_10*v(LOYALTY) - - - - 0.091    0.060*   
                                                               [0.086]     [0.032]    
    
# Observations 3,522 13,129 3,502 13,001 3,522 13,109 
# Individuals  712 2,654 708 2,627 712 2,650 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients and Standard errors are presented. The rest of the specification is similar to that 
presented in Table B1 in the appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
The Voice Function: Job Satisfaction 
 
Dependent variable: Overall Job Satisfaction; COLS;  EPICURUS Data (2004) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline High-Tenure Compensating Differentials 
LMWAGE                                          0.076***    0.076***    0.072**     0.059**  
                                                         [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.028]    
LHOURS                                         -0.056 -0.056 -0.042 -0.030 
                                                         [0.051]     [0.051]     [0.051]     [0.049]    
MALE                                               -0.062**    -0.062**    -0.067**    -0.047*   
                                                         [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.028]    
MARRIED                                         0.050*      0.050*   0.043    0.052*   
                                                         [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.029]     [0.027]    
LCHILDLT16                                 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.013 
                                                         [0.027]     [0.027]     [0.026]     [0.025]    
LEXPERIENCE                                0.066***    0.066***    0.064***    0.057*** 
                                                         [0.021]     [0.021]     [0.021]     [0.020]    
LTENURE                                        -0.057***   -0.057***   -0.058***   -0.055*** 
                                                         [0.016]     [0.017]     [0.016]     [0.015]    
TRUNION                                        -0.092*** -0.102   -0.070**    -0.065**  
                                                         [0.032]     [0.076]     [0.032]     [0.031]    
TRUNIONxLTENURE                 -           0.004 -            -            
                                                                     [0.031]                           
LINJURED                                     -           -             -0.135*** -            
                                                                                 [0.039]                
LSICK                                             -           -             -0.151*** -            
                                                                                 [0.026]                
MACHINE                                     -           -           -              -0.050**  
                                                                                            [0.025]    
INTENSITY                                   -           -           -              -0.742*** 
                                                                                            [0.063]    
IDEAS                                            -           -           -               0.331*** 
                                                                                            [0.024]    
TRAINING                                    0.059 0.059 0.051    0.072**  
                                                         [0.037]     [0.037]     [0.037]     [0.036]    
PERMANENT                                   0.130***    0.130***    0.126***    0.095*** 
                                                         [0.027]     [0.027]     [0.027]     [0.026]    
FRANCE                                            0.117***    0.117***    0.121***    0.062*   
                                                         [0.038]     [0.038]     [0.037]     [0.036]    
GREECE                                           0.241***    0.241***    0.212***    0.327*** 
                                                         [0.044]     [0.044]     [0.044]     [0.044]    
NETHERLANDS                              0.290***    0.290***    0.276***    0.249*** 
                                                         [0.039]     [0.039]     [0.038]     [0.037]    
CONSTANT                                   -0.042 -0.043 0.006 0.188 
                                                         [0.211]     [0.211]     [0.209]     [0.202]    
  
No. of Observations                        3,379 3,379 3,379 3,360 
R2   0.053 0.053 0.070 0.147 
F-statistic                                             5.66***     5.49***     7.19***    15.93*** 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors. Specifications also include dummy variables as 
controls for: EDUCATION [4], FIRMSIZE [5], SECTOR [4], and OCCUPATION [11].  
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Table 7 
Propensity Score Estimates of Membership/Satisfaction Differentials 
 
 Nearest Neighbour Matching Kernel-based Matching 
 No Common 
Support 
Common 
Support 
No Common 
Support 
Common 
Support 
ATT -0.101 -0.102 -0.077 -0.078 
[S.E.] [0.045] [0.045] [0.029] [0.030] 
|t| 2.24 2.27 2.68 2.62 
# Treated 800 717 800 717 
# Control 834 487 3,017 2,529 
 
Notes:  
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 100 replications are displayed for kernel-based matching.  
The probit estimator used to generate the propensity scores conditions on X’s that, we argue, are exogenous with 
respect to membership and are liable to affect both membership propensities and job satisfaction. These are: 
LNMWAGE, LHOURS, MALE, EDUCATION [4], MARRIED, LCHILDLT16, LEXPERIENCE, LTENURE, 
TRAINING, CONTRACT [6], SECTOR [4]; FIRMSIZE [4], OCCUPATION [10], INDUSTRY [17], 
UNEMPLOYMENT, COUNTRY [4]. The results from the probit equation are available by the authors upon 
request.  
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Table 8 
The Exit Function: Quitting Intentions 
 
Dependent variable: Propensity to Quit, Logit, EPICURUS Data (2004) 
 Pooled UW NUW 
 Coef.   [SE] Coef.   [SE] Coef.   [SE] 
 M.Eff. M.Eff. M.Eff. 
JOBSATISFACTION                  -0.203 [0.022]    -0.174 [0.054]    -0.202  [0.022]    
 -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.047*** 
TRUNION   -0.657  [0.348]               -                    -          
 -0.133**     
TRUNIONxSATISFACTION   0.030 [0.051]               -                    -          
 0.007     
LMWAGE                                  0.152 [0.096]    0.476 [0.294]    0.079  [0.103]    
 0.033 0.065 0.018 
LHOURS                                     -0.660 [0.165]    -0.895 [0.545]      -0.630  [0.174]    
 -0.144*** -0.122* -0.146*** 
LSECEDUC 0.026 [0.172]    -0.350 [0.438]    0.198  [0.194]    
 0.006 -0.043 0.047 
HSECEDUC 0.242 [0.151]      -1.157 [0.360]       0.542  [0.174]    
 0.053 -0.140*** 0.127*** 
PSECEDUC 0.138 [0.147]    -0.522 [0.320]       0.317    [0.171]    
 0.030 -0.068* 0.074* 
MALE    0.310 [0.095]       0.536  [0.270]       0.281  [0.104]    
 0.068*** 0.070** 0.065*** 
MARRIED   -0.330 [0.095]      -0.498   [0.269]      -0.333  [0.103]    
 -0.072*** -0.070* -0.077*** 
LCHILDLT16     0.309 [0.088]       0.923 [0.239]       0.219   [0.097]    
 0.067*** 0.126*** 0.051** 
LEXPERIENCE                          -0.429 [0.069]      -0.427  [0.216]      -0.412  [0.073]    
 -0.094*** -0.058** -0.095*** 
LTENURE                                   -0.319 [0.053]      -0.861 [0.152]      -0.239  [0.058]    
 -0.070*** -0.117*** -0.055*** 
PERMANENT    0.784 [0.128]       1.857 [0.491]       0.701  [0.135]    
 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 
TRAINING 0.120 [0.088]    0.222 [0.232]    0.108  [0.097]    
 0.026 0.031 0.025 
FRANCE   -0.751 [0.123]      -1.078 [0.370]      -0.714  [0.132]    
 -0.152*** -0.115*** -0.157*** 
GREECE   -0.967 [0.151]      -1.203 [0.405]      -0.977  [0.166]    
 -0.186*** -0.131*** -0.202*** 
NETHERLANDS    0.230   [0.126]    -0.341 [0.314]       0.392  [0.141]    
 0.051* -0.045 0.093*** 
CONSTANT                                 3.319 [0.694]    2.287 [2.127]       3.408  [0.744]    
  
No. of Observations                   3,379 717 2,662 
Pseudo R2                                   0.142 0.230 0.129 
Log-Likelihood                           -1,880.4 -297.9 -1,545.0 
LR χ2                                          623.7*** 177.7*** 458.3*** 
 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Marginal Effects for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, evaluated at the mean of continuous 
variables.  Robust standard errors.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics  
 
Table A1 
Variable Definitions and Key Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean (S.D.)
TRUNION Dummy variable (DV) equal to 1 if respondent is a member of a trade union, 0 if not  21.0% (0.41) 
FRANCE DV=1 if respondent is an employed sample member in France, 0 if not  26.41% (0.44) 
GREECE DV=1 if respondent is an employed sample member in Greece, 0 if not 20.96% (0.41) 
NETHERLANDS DV=1 if respondent is an employed sample member in the Netherlands, 0 if not 26.38% (0.44) 
UNITEDKINGDOM DV=1 if respondent is an employed sample member in the United Kingdom, 0 if not 26.25% (0.44) 
JOBSAT All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present main job, using a 
0-10 scale? 
6.78 (2.09) 
JOBSAT_COLS Job satisfaction measure, transformed into a cardinal variable 0.54 (0.72) 
QUIT DV=1 if respondent replies “I will quit myself” in the question “What would be your main 
reason to stop working with your current employer in your main job?” 
34.6% (0.48) 
MNWAGE Monthly Wage after taxes from main job, divided by the PPP conversion factor to official 
exchange rate ratio (World Development Indicators).  
1590.0 (1404.7) 
HOURS How many hours are you formally obliged to work during a working week as part of your 
contract of employment in your main job? 
35.00 (8.88) 
NOPREDUC DV=1 if highest education qualification is: “No Education”, “Pre-Primary”, or “Primary 
Education” 
14.3% (0.35) 
LSECEDUC DV=1 if highest education qualification obtained is: “Lower Secondary Education” 13.3% (0.34) 
HSECEDUC DV=1 if highest education qualification obtained is: “Upper Secondary Education” 37.5% (0.48) 
PSECEDUC DV=1 if highest education qualification obtained is: “Post Secondary Non-Technical 
Education” 
34.9% (0.48) 
MARRIED DV=1 if respondent is married, 0 if not.  50.1% (0.50) 
CHILDLT16 Number of children aged less than 16 0.66 (0.98) 
MALE DV=1 if respondent is male, 0 if female 48.8% (0.50) 
AGE Age in years 37.59 (10.74) 
EXPERIENCE Number of years since getting the first job after leaving school/full-time education 19.53 (11.51) 
TENURE Number of years since stated working with current employer/firm 9.34 (8.73) 
TENURE 1_2 DV=1 if respondent has been employed with current firm for less than 2 years 22.2% (0.42) 
TENURE 3_5 DV=1 if respondent has been employed with current firm between 2 and 5 years 25.8% (0.44) 
TENURE 5_10 DV=1 if respondent has been employed with current firm between 5 and 10  years 20.0% (0.40) 
TENURE _mt10 DV=1 if respondent has been employed with current firm for more than 10 years 32.1% (0.47) 
TRAINING DV=1 if current employer has provided any training during the last 12 months 36.8% (0.48) 
PERMANENT DV=1 if respondent has a permanent contract (with no fixed ending time) in main job  84.8% (0.36) 
CT_PNORISK DV=1 if respondent has a permanent contract with no risk of loosing job 58.8% (0.49) 
CT _PRISK DV=1 if respondent has a permanent contract with risk of loosing job, but compensated 17.5% (0.38) 
CT _PHIGHRISK DV=1 if respondent has a permanent contract with risk of loosing job, not compensated 8.5% (0.28) 
CT_TTERM DV=1 if respondent has a temporary contract with possibility of continuation to a permanent 
one 
2.4% (0.15) 
CT_TTEMP DV=1 if respondent has a temporary contract with possibility of continuation to temporary 
contract 
4.1% (0.20) 
CT_TFIRED DV=1 if respondent has a temporary contract with no possibility of continuation  1.8% (0.13) 
PRIVATE DV=1 if respondent is: Employed by a private company 60.6% (0.49) 
NONPROFIT DV=1 if respondent is: Employed by a non-profit institution 8.3% (0.28) 
CIVIL DV=1 if respondent is: A civil servant 17.9% (0.38) 
PUBLIC DV=1 if respondent is: Employed in a public company 13.2% (0.34) 
FIRM1_10 DV=1 if respondent is employed in a firm employing: Less than 10 employees 21.6% (0.41) 
FIRM 10_24 DV=1 if respondent is employed in a firm employing: 10-24 employees 14.2% (0.35) 
FIRM 25_99 DV=1 if respondent is employed in a firm employing: 25-99 employees 20.9% (0.41) 
FIRM 100_499 DV=1 if respondent is employed in a firm employing: 100-499 employees 20.5% (0.40) 
FIRM _mt500 DV=1 if respondent is employed in a firm employing: More than 500 employees 22.9% (0.42) 
MINEQUARRY DV=1 if industry of  is “Mining and quarrying” 0.1% (0.02) 
UTILITIES DV=1 if industry is “Electricity, gas and water supply” 1.4% (0.12) 
MANUFACTURING DV=1 if industry is “Manufacturing industries” 7.2% (0.26) 
CONSTRUCTION DV=1 if industry is “Construction” 5.2% (0.22) 
TRADE DV=1 if industry is “Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and other consumer 
goods” 
13.9% (0.35) 
SERVICES DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Hotels and restaurants” 4.1% (0.20) 
TRANSCOM DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Transport, storage and communications” 7.5% (0.26) 
FINANCIAL DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Financial intermediation” 4.3% (0.20) 
REALBUSINESS DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Real estate, renting and business activities” 1.5% (0.12) 
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OTHERSERV DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Other services” 11.2% (0.32) 
PUBADMINDEF DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Public administration and defence” 9.1% (0.29) 
EDUCATION DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Education” 4.0% (0.20) 
HEALTHSOCIAL DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Health and social work” 9.9% (0.30) 
SOCPERSONAL DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Other community, social and personal service activities” 4.2% (0.20) 
PRIVATHH DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Private households with employed persons” 0.8% (0.09) 
MULTINATIONAL DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Extra-territorial organizations and bodies” 0.7% (0.09) 
OTHER DV=1 if sector of activity is:“Other activities” 14.9% (0.36) 
MANAGER DV=1 if occupation is: “Managers in private and public sector (e.g. chief executives)” 2.9% (0.17) 
PROFESSIONAL DV=1 if occupation is: “Professional occupations (e.g. architects, teaching professionals and 
doctors)”       
2.1% (0.14) 
TECHASSOC DV=1 if occupation is: “Technical occupations & associate professional (e.g. ship and aircraft 
controllers, nursing professionals)” 
10.8% (0.31) 
CLERICAL DV=1 if occupation is: “Clerical & secretarial occupations (e.g. library clerks, cashiers and 
tellers)” 
25.1% (0.43) 
CRAFT DV=1 if occupation is: “Craft and related trades workers (e.g. painters, construction workers, 
and printing workers)” 
3.4% (0.18) 
PERSPROTECT DV=1 if occupation is: “Personal & protective service occ. (e.g. travel attendants, personal 
care)” 
4.3% (0.20) 
LABOURINGMCMT DV=1 if occupation is: “Labouring in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport (e.g. 
freight handlers)” 
4.9% (0.21) 
SALESERVIC DV=1 if occupation is: “Sales and services occupations (sales and services, building 
caretakers, window cleaners, messengers, porters, doorkeepers and garbage collectors)” 
15.8% (0.37) 
PLANTMACHINE DV=1 if occupation is: “Plant and machine operators and assemblers (e.g. mining, mineral 
and metal, glass, wood, chemical plant operators and machine operators, assemblers, drivers 
and mobile plant operators, motor and ship-deck crew)” 
3.6% (0.19) 
ARMED DV=1 if occupation is: “Armed forces” 2.1% (0.14) 
OTHER DV=1 if occupation is: “Other occupations” 25.0% (0.43) 
MACHINE DV=1 if a machine or assembly line is “very important” or “important” in the effort 
respondent puts in his/her job 
20.1% (0.40) 
INTENSITY_INDEX Index created as an average of the intensity of the following factors making one’s job hard 
and initially valued on a scale from 1 to 5: (1) “High Speed or High Rhythm”; (2) “Tight 
Deadlines”; (3) “Relationship with the Boss or Supervisor”; (4) “Colleagues or co-workers”.  
53.2% (0.20) 
IDEAS DV=1 if respondent replies he/she can put own ideas into practice into work 50.7% (0.50) 
PUNEMPLOYED DV=1 if respondent spent any weeks unemployed during last year 10.79% (0.31) 
LPUNEMPLOYED Log of number of weeks in unemployment during last year 0.25 (0.81) 
WK_SAME DV=1 if working time in main job is: “The same every day” 54.1% (0.50) 
WK_SHIFTS DV=1 if working time in main job is: “Changing with rotating shifts” 14.8% (0.36) 
WK_EMPLOYEE DV=1 if working time in main job is: “Variable day to day, chosen by the employer” 10.8% (0.31) 
WK_BOTH DV=1 if working time in main job is: “Variable day to day, chosen by the employee” 11.7% (0.32) 
WK_EMPLOYER DV=1 if working time in main job is: “Variable day to day, chosen by both employer and 
employee” 
8.2% (0.27) 
ORG_ALONE DV=1 if work organization involves: “Working Always with the Same People” 17.8% (0.38) 
ORG_VARYING DV=1 if work organization involves: “Working with Teams, that are Changing” 16.3% (0.37) 
ORG_TEAM DV=1 if work organization involves: “Woking mostly on my own” 65.8% (0.47) 
FIXED_ROUTINE DV=1 if job described as: ”Having a Completely Fixed Routine”  30.7% (0.46) 
TASK_CHOICE DV=1 if job described as: “Involving a Variety of Duties, on which the respondent is 
responsible and can choose when to do what” 
60.9% (0.49) 
OWN_CONTROL DV=1 if job described as: “No One Controls my Work” 6.7% (0.25) 
HIGH_SPEED DV=1 if “High Speed” is valued by 4 or 5, on a scale from 1 to 5, among the factors making 
job hard 
36.1% (0.48) 
MEDIUM_SPEED DV=1 if “High Speed” is valued by 2 or 3, on the same scale 37.8% (0.48) 
LOW_SPEED DV=1 if “High Speed” is valued by 1, on the same scale 26.2% (0.44) 
DEAD_OFTEN DV=1 if “Tight Deadlines” is valued by 4 or 5, on the same scale 41.5% (0.49) 
DEAD_SOME DV=1 if “High Speed” is valued by 2 or 3, on the same scale 36.3% (0.48) 
DEAD_NEVER DV=1 if “High Speed” is valued by 1, on the same scale 22.2% (0.42) 
LFRETIRE Logarithm of formal age of retirement in one’s job 4.15 (0.06) 
RETIRELT65 DV=1 if formal age of retirement in the job is less than 65 39.5% (0.49) 
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Table A2 
Vignette Attributes: Variable Names and Sample Averages 
 
Type of contract (dummy variables) 
(v)CT_PNORISK Permanent contract with no risk of being fired 0.19 
(v)CT_PRISK Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation  0.12 
(v)CT_PHIGHRISK Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation 0.19 
(v)CT_TPERM One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent contract 0.24 
(v)CT_TTEMP One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary contract 0.15 
(v)CT_TFIRED One-year contract with no probability of continuation (Reference Group) 0.12 
  
Ln(Working hours)   
(v)LHOURS Logarithm of working hours (ranged from 20 to 50) 3.54 
(v)LHOURSQ Square of logarithm of working hours 12.64 
  
Net wages per hour: 
(v)WAGE (Expressed as a percentage of wage at the current job) -0.01 
  
Working schedules (dummy variables) 
(v)WK_FLEXIBLE Flexible working hours 0.18 
(v)WK_OFFICE Office working hours (you can choose which days your work) 0.28 
(v)WK_ROTATE Rotating shifts (system) 0.32 
(v)WK_EMPLOYER Employer decides (Reference Group) 0.22 
  
Training (dummy variables) 
(v)TRAIN_30-90 1 month training / 3 months training  0.29 
(v)TRAIN_5-10 5 days training / 10 days training  0.45 
(v)TRAIN_0-1 No training / 1 day training (Reference Group) 0.26 
  
Work organization (dummy variables) 
(v)ORG_ALONE Job not in teamwork  0.29 
(v)ORG_VARYING Job in varying teamwork 0.30 
(v)ORG_TEAM Job in fixed team (Reference Group) 0.41 
  
Control over own work (dummy variables) 
(v)JB_FIXROUTINE Job has a fixed routine 0.41 
(v)JB_TASKCHOICE Can choose order tasks: fixed job tasks, but you may decide when & how things are done 0.33 
(v)JB_OWNCONTROL No one controls your work (Reference Group) 0.26 
  
Intensity due to high speed (dummy variables) 
(v)HIGHSPEED Often high speed 0.28 
(v)MEDIUMSPEED Sometimes high speed 0.13 
(v)LOWSPEED Never working at high speed (Reference Group) 0.17 
  
Intensity due to tight deadlines (dummy variables) 
(v)DEADOFTEN Often tight deadlines 0.17 
(v)DEADSOME Sometimes tight deadlines 0.16 
(v)DEADNEVER Never working with tight deadlines (Reference Group) 0.09 
  
Retirement & Labour disability (dummy variables) 
(v)RETIRE65 Have to stop before 65 (because the job is physically very demanding) 0.12 
(v)RETIRE60 Early retirement 55 (firm has early retirement plans) 0.25 
(v)RETIRE55 Early retirement 60 (firm has early retirement plans) 0.20 
(v)RETIRENO The firm has no early retirement plans (Reference Group) 0.43 
  
Loyalty-no shirking(dummy variables) 
(v)LOYALTY Loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance impossible 0.56 
(v)NOLOYALTY The firm requires no loyalty; shirking & low performance is impossible 0.44 
   
 
Notes:  
Mean differences in attribute incidence are not statistically significant, with the only exception of (v)CT_PHIGHRISK. 18% of 
union workers received this attribute, versus 19% of non-union workers. A student’s t-test for the difference between the two gives 
a value of -2.59.  
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 Appendix B: Analytical Output 
Table B1 
Vignette Evaluation: Longitudinal Analysis 
 
 
Vignette Evaluation          
Panel (A) 
COLS with Fixed Effects 
Panel (B) 
COLS with Random Effects  
and Individual Characteristics 
 Union Non-Union Union Non-Union 
      Vignette Attributes Coef. [S.E.] Coef. [S.E.] Coef. [S.E.] Coef. [S.E.] 
(v)CT_PNORISK                       0.482*** [0.062]      0.411*** [0.033]      0.499*** [0.063]       0.400*** [0.033]   
(v)CT_PRISK                                               0.329*** [0.067]      0.237*** [0.036]      0.325*** [0.068]       0.212*** [0.036]   
(v)CT_PHIGHRISK                                    0.144**  [0.069]      0.145*** [0.037]      0.123*  [0.068]       0.113*** [0.036]   
(v)CT_TPERM                                             0.398*** [0.071]      0.296*** [0.038]      0.387*** [0.068]       0.290*** [0.036]   
(v)CT_TTEMP                                             0.223*** [0.059]      0.289*** [0.032]      0.200*** [0.057]       0.278*** [0.031]   
(v)LHOURS                                                 8.499*** [1.464]      7.288*** [0.807]      8.028*** [1.364]       7.113*** [0.735]   
(v)LHOURSQ                                             -1.257*** [0.210]     -1.097*** [0.116]     -1.192*** [0.196]      -1.075*** [0.106]   
(v)WAGE                                                     1.005*** [0.044]      1.071*** [0.024]      1.019*** [0.046]       1.091*** [0.025]   
(v)WK_FLEXIBLE                                      0.118**  [0.057]      0.109*** [0.030]      0.155*** [0.054]       0.166*** [0.028]   
(v)WK_OFFICE                                       0.041 [0.049]      0.090*** [0.026]   0.042 [0.047]       0.139*** [0.025]   
(v)WK_ROTATE                                        -0.101**  [0.046]     -0.089*** [0.024]     -0.092** [0.046]    -0.037 [0.024]   
(v)TRAIN_30-90                                       0.051 [0.043]      0.122*** [0.023]   0.011 [0.041]       0.086*** [0.022]   
(v)TRAIN_5-10                                            0.129*** [0.039]      0.083*** [0.021]      0.082** [0.037]       0.064*** [0.020]   
(v)ORG_ALONE                                        0.132*** [0.036]      0.110*** [0.019]      0.100*** [0.036]       0.113*** [0.019]   
(v)ORG_VARYING                                 0.050 [0.036]   0.028 [0.019]      0.069*  [0.036]    0.027 [0.019]   
(v)JB_FIXROUTINE                                  -0.097**  [0.040]     -0.092*** [0.021]     -0.105*** [0.038]      -0.128*** [0.020]  
(v)JB_TASKCHOICE                                 -0.073*   [0.044]   -0.008 [0.023]     -0.085** [0.042]      -0.043*   [0.022]   
(v)HIGHSPEED   -0.189*** [0.042]     -0.142*** [0.022]     -0.182*** [0.041]      -0.113*** [0.021]   
(v)MEDIUMSPEED    0.097*   [0.051]   -0.033 [0.026]      0.085*  [0.051]    -0.005 [0.027]   
(v)DEADOFTEN   -0.231*** [0.043]     -0.121*** [0.023]     -0.246*** [0.044]      -0.122*** [0.023]   
(v)DEADSOME -0.017 [0.044]   -0.023 [0.024]   -0.017 [0.045]    -0.004 [0.024]   
(v)RETIRE65                   0.116*   [0.061]      0.137*** [0.033]      0.128** [0.060]       0.140*** [0.032]   
(v)RETIRE60                   0.242*** [0.048]      0.236*** [0.025]      0.245*** [0.048]       0.241*** [0.025]   
(v)RETIRE55                   0.121**  [0.047]      0.158*** [0.025]      0.112** [0.048]       0.157*** [0.025]   
(v)LOYALTY                   0.174*** [0.031]      0.122*** [0.017]      0.184*** [0.032]       0.126*** [0.017]   
      Individual Characteristics   
LMWAGE                                                   -     -  0.008 [0.057]    0.005 [0.025]   
LHOURS   -     -     0.426*** [0.111]       0.096**  [0.042]   
PERMANENT_NORISK                           -     -  -0.111 [0.102]      -0.080**  [0.038]   
PERMANENT_RISK_COMPENS.           -     -  -0.013 [0.109]      -0.096**  [0.045]   
PERMANENT_RISK_NOCOMPENS.     -     -  -0.081 [0.124]    -0.056 [0.051]   
TEMPORARY_TO PERMANENT           -     -  0.054 [0.185]    -0.055 [0.077]   
TEMPORARY_TO TEMPORARY           -     -  0.235 [0.157]    0.025 [0.060]   
WORK_SAMETIMES                                -     -  -0.128 [0.079]    -0.036 [0.041]   
WORK_ROTSHIFTS                                 -     -  -0.07 [0.083]    0.008 [0.048]   
WORK_VARIABLE_EMPLOYEE           -     -  -0.145 [0.103]    0.043 [0.050]   
WORK_VARIABLE_BOTH                      -     -  -0.159 [0.098]    -0.025 [0.049]   
TRAINING                                                -     -  0.008 [0.046]      -0.039*   [0.023]   
SOLO_WORK                                            -     -  -0.011 [0.060]    -0.003 [0.029]   
VARYING_TEAMS                                   -     -  0.053 [0.054]    -0.045 [0.031]   
FIXED_ROUTINE                                    -     -  -0.054 [0.083]    0.06 [0.042]   
TASK_CHOICE                                         -     -  0.031 [0.079]    0.049 [0.038]  
HIGH_SPEED                                           -     -  -0.022 [0.068]    -0.034 [0.034]   
MEDIUM_SPPED                                     -     -  0.049 [0.062]    0.002 [0.031]   
DEADLINES_OFTEN                              -     -     0.113*  [0.067]       0.102*** [0.034]   
DEADLINES_SOMETIMES                     -     -     0.133** [0.064]    0.049 [0.033]  
LFRETIRE                                                  -     -     1.031*  [0.534]    0.060 [0.354]   
RETIRE<65                                                -     -  0.022 [0.064]    0.026 [0.041]   
MALE                                                        -     -  -0.019 [0.051]    0.027 [0.025]   
EDUCPRIM                                                -     -  -0.023 [0.081]      -0.072*   [0.043]   
EDUCSEC                                  -     -  -0.028 [0.066]    -0.049 [0.039]   
EDUCVOC   -     -  -0.035 [0.062]    -0.063 [0.039]   
MARRIED                                                  -     -  0.063 [0.051]    0.031 [0.024]   
LCHILDLT16                                             -     -  -0.052 [0.046]    -0.02 [0.023]   
Continued in next page 
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Continued from last page 
LEXPERIENCE                                        -     -    -0.082*  [0.046]      -0.082*** [0.018]   
LTENURE                                                  -     -  0.001 [0.030]    0.001 [0.013]   
NONPROFIT                                             -     -  -0.066 [0.079]      -0.080*   [0.043]   
CIVILSERV                                                -     -  -0.047 [0.057]    -0.042 [0.035]   
PUBLIC                                                      -     -  -0.087 [0.061]       0.059*   [0.034]   
FIRM10_24                                                 -     -  0.084 [0.093]    0.044 [0.034]   
FIRM25_99                                                 -     -  -0.068 [0.083]    0.015 [0.032]   
FIRM100_499                                             -     -  -0.002 [0.082]    0.008 [0.035]   
FIRM_MT500                                             -     -  -0.072 [0.084]    0.001 [0.036]   
MANAGERS                                              -     -  -0.101 [0.154]    0.077 [0.068]   
PROFESSIONAL                                       -     -  0.194 [0.142]    0.059 [0.079]   
CLERICAL                                                 -     -     0.140*  [0.076]    -0.048 [0.040]   
CRAFT                                                       -     -  0.075 [0.112]       0.151**  [0.068]   
PERSONAL                                                -     -  -0.008 [0.116]       0.155**  [0.064]   
LABOURING                                             -     -  0.066 [0.109]    0.028 [0.059]   
SALESERVICE                                          -     -     0.168*  [0.093]    0.025 [0.042]   
MACHINE                                                 -     -  0.055 [0.098]    0.098 [0.072]   
ARMY                                                        -     -  0.022 [0.155]    -0.03 [0.093]   
OTHEROCC                                              -     -  0.064 [0.072]    -0.002 [0.040]   
FRANCE                                                    -     -  -0.083 [0.078]      -0.105*** [0.035]   
GREECE                                                    -     -  -0.023 [0.081]    -0.038 [0.042]   
NETHERLANDS                                       -     -  0.031 [0.065]       0.079**  [0.034]   
CONSTANT                                              -15.096*** [2.558]    -12.722*** [1.411]    -19.753*** [3.249]     -12.760*** [1.977]    
                                                                                                      
# Observations [# Individuals]                  3,923 [794] 14,793 [2,992] 3,522 [712] 13,109 [2,650] 
R2 (Within, Between, Overall)                    0.295; 0.070; 0.211 0.277; 0.074; 0.208 0.303; 0.209; 0.264 0.282; 0.138; 0.231 
Ε[(α,Χ), θ]                                                  -0.017 -0.001  0.000      0.000          
σθ, σξ 0.560 0.720 0.546 0.749 0.413 0.719 0.401 0.745 
ρ                                                       0.377 0.347 0.248 0.224 
Goodness of fit                                          F=51.86*** F=180.50*** χ2=1,841.3*** χ2=4,496.9*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM χ2(1) test for R.E.   362.3*** 1,262.3*** 
Hausman χ2(25) test (F.E. vs. R.E.) 7.83 66.2***   
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B2 
Vignette Evaluation: Endogenous Switching Analysis 
 
Source: EPICURUS Data (2004); Conjoint Analysis 
Vignette Evaluation Union Non-Union Selection Equation 
 Coef. [S.E.] Coef. [S.E.] Coef. [S.E.] 
      Vignette Attributes       
(v)CT_PNORISK                       0.475***  [0.068]       0.406***  [0.036]    0.009  [0.046]    
(v)CT_PRISK                                                           0.313***  [0.068]       0.210***  [0.039]    -0.04  [0.053]    
(v)CT_PHIGHRISK                                             0.099  [0.073]       0.119***  [0.039]    -0.094  [0.062]    
(v)CT_TPERM                                                         0.363***  [0.075]       0.298***  [0.040]    0.011  [0.070]    
(v)CT_TTEMP                                                         0.194***  [0.059]       0.267***  [0.032]    0.009  [0.052]    
(v)LHOURS                                                             7.647***  [1.525]       7.317***  [0.835]      -2.578*   [1.451]    
(v)LHOURSQ                                                         -1.137***  [0.219]      -1.105***  [0.120]       0.376*    [0.209]    
(v)WAGE                                                                 1.014***  [0.054]       1.095***  [0.029]    0.003  [0.028]    
(v)WK_FLEXIBLE                                                  0.171***  [0.059]       0.213***  [0.030]    0.079  [0.054]    
(v)WK_OFFICE                                                   0.050  [0.053]       0.173***  [0.028]    0.052  [0.046]    
(v)WK_ROTATE                                                  -0.072  [0.047]    -0.002  [0.025]    0.005  [0.036]    
(v)TRAIN_30-90                                                   -0.010  [0.044]       0.067***  [0.023]    -0.051  [0.040]    
(v)TRAIN_5-10                                                     0.053  [0.037]       0.051**   [0.020]    -0.030  [0.035]    
(v)ORG_ALONE                                                    0.067*    [0.037]       0.106***  [0.020]    -0.028  [0.029]    
(v)ORG_VARYING                                                0.066*    [0.038]    0.027  [0.020]    -0.033  [0.030]    
(v)JB_FIXROUTINE                                              -0.129***  [0.039]      -0.149***  [0.021]    0.001  [0.038]    
(v)JB_TASKCHOICE                                             -0.099**   [0.042]      -0.061***  [0.023]    -0.022  [0.042]    
(v)HIGHSPEED   -0.167***  [0.041]      -0.093***  [0.023]    0.031  [0.035]    
(v)MEDIUMSPEED 0.086  [0.053]    0.008  [0.029]    -0.008  [0.040]    
(v)DEADOFTEN   -0.230***  [0.043]      -0.115***  [0.024]    -0.003  [0.035]    
(v)DEADSOME 0.004  [0.046]    0.023  [0.024]    -0.015  [0.033]    
(v)RETIRE65                   0.130**   [0.064]       0.123***  [0.035]       0.094*    [0.057]    
(v)RETIRE60                   0.265***  [0.052]       0.229***  [0.027]    -0.016  [0.040]    
(v)RETIRE55                   0.119**   [0.049]       0.138***  [0.027]    0.023  [0.039]    
(v)LOYALTY                   0.186***  [0.033]       0.124***  [0.018]       0.039*    [0.022]    
      Individual Characteristics       
LMWAGE                                                    0.016  [0.050]    0.003  [0.028]    0.097  [0.064]    
LHOURS    0.425***  [0.113]       0.093**   [0.040]    0.071  [0.117]    
PERMANENT_NORISK                                    -0.109  [0.087]      -0.081**   [0.039]    0.069  [0.117]    
PERMANENT_RISK_COMPENSATION         -0.004  [0.094]      -0.102**   [0.046]       0.240*    [0.131]    
PERMANENT_RISK_NOCOMPENSATION   -0.076  [0.105]    -0.056  [0.050]    0.076  [0.145]    
TEMPORARY_TO PERMANENT                     0.084  [0.197]    -0.066  [0.079]       0.407*    [0.229]    
TEMPORARY_TO TEMPORARY                        0.259*    [0.151]    0.02  [0.061]       0.321*    [0.187]    
WORK_SAMETIMES                                            -0.147*    [0.082]    -0.028  [0.048]      -0.342***  [0.108]    
WORK_ROTSHIFTS                                           -0.07  [0.081]    0.008  [0.047]    -0.055  [0.119]    
WORK_VARIABLE_EMPLOYEE                       -0.174*    [0.105]    0.054  [0.061]      -0.505***  [0.134]    
WORK_VARIABLE_BOTH                                  -0.181*    [0.097]    -0.018  [0.057]      -0.446***  [0.130]    
TRAINING                                                  0.019  [0.047]      -0.041*    [0.024]       0.133**   [0.061]    
SOLO_WORK                                                 -0.016  [0.059]    -0.002  [0.030]    -0.045  [0.078]    
VARYING_TEAMS                                             0.048  [0.049]    -0.044  [0.032]    -0.09  [0.078]    
FIXED_ROUTINE                                             -0.054  [0.085]    0.055  [0.046]    0.104  [0.108]    
TASK_CHOICE                                               0.02  [0.080]    0.047  [0.042]    -0.096  [0.099]    
HIGH_SPEED                                                -0.017  [0.071]    -0.035  [0.034]    0.036  [0.094]    
MEDIUM_SPPED                                              0.049  [0.062]    0.002  [0.030]    -0.001  [0.085]    
DEADLINES_OFTEN                                        0.104  [0.067]       0.104***  [0.038]    -0.104  [0.091]    
DEADLINES_SOMETIMES                                  0.120*    [0.064]    0.050  [0.035]    -0.101  [0.088]    
LFRETIRE                                                     1.046**   [0.478]    0.050  [0.377]    0.032  [0.837]    
RETIRE<65                                                 0.035  [0.060]    0.019  [0.042]       0.186*    [0.099]    
MALE                                                      -0.006  [0.050]    0.02  [0.030]       0.238***  [0.067]    
EDUCPRIM                                               -0.037  [0.087]    -0.065  [0.047]      -0.207*   [0.109]    
EDUCSEC                                -0.033  [0.067]    -0.046  [0.040]    -0.031  [0.093]    
EDUCVOC -0.041  [0.064]    -0.058  [0.039]    -0.033  [0.093]    
MARRIED                                                   0.065  [0.048]    0.032  [0.025]    -0.040  [0.065]    
LCHILDLT16                                                -0.049  [0.043]    -0.021  [0.023]    0.042  [0.058]    
LEXPERIENCE                                               -0.074  [0.049]      -0.086***  [0.021]       0.174***  [0.057]    
LTENURE                                                   0.021  [0.037]    -0.006  [0.023]       0.289***  [0.038]    
NONPROFIT                                                 -0.045  [0.079]      -0.087*    [0.045]       0.213*    [0.121]    
CIVILSERV                                                 -0.01  [0.069]    -0.062  [0.063]       0.524***  [0.103]    
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PUBLIC                                                    -0.066  [0.065]    0.052  [0.039]       0.282***  [0.084]    
FIRM10_24                                                 0.098  [0.085]    0.043  [0.033]    0.124  [0.108]    
FIRM25_99                                                 -0.041  [0.087]    0.009  [0.037]       0.353***  [0.099]    
FIRM100_499                                               0.035  [0.089]    -0.005  [0.049]       0.540***  [0.102]    
FIRM_MT500                                                -0.043  [0.091]    -0.006  [0.044]       0.433***  [0.107]    
MANAGERS                                                  -0.113  [0.113]    0.083  [0.083]    -0.291  [0.188]    
PROFESSIONAL                                              0.194  [0.146]    0.057  [0.073]    0.069  [0.203]    
CLERICAL                                                     0.138*    [0.080]    -0.049  [0.043]    -0.041  [0.105]    
CRAFT                                                     0.102  [0.111]       0.135**   [0.068]       0.363**   [0.159]    
PERSONAL                                                  -0.005  [0.110]       0.154**   [0.063]    -0.008  [0.163]    
LABOURING                                                 0.099  [0.108]    0.018  [0.067]       0.292**   [0.148]    
SALESERVICE                                                  0.157*    [0.091]    0.027  [0.046]    -0.101  [0.122]    
MACHINE                                                   0.078  [0.101]    0.081  [0.073]       0.404***  [0.155]    
ARMY                                                      -0.008  [0.166]    -0.022  [0.111]      -0.526**   [0.216]    
OTHEROCC                                                  0.063  [0.073]    -0.003  [0.042]    0.019  [0.101]    
UTILITIES                                                 -  -     0.464**   [0.213]    
MANUFACTURING                                           -  -  0.005  [0.131]    
CONSTRUCTION                                              -  -     0.308**   [0.149]    
TRADE                                                     -  -  -0.203  [0.123]    
HOTELS                                                    -  -  0.23  [0.176]    
TRANSCOM                                                  -  -     0.334***  [0.118]    
FINANCE                                                   -  -  -0.082  [0.164]    
BUSINESS                                                  -  -  0.11  [0.277]    
SERVICES                                                  -  -  0.011  [0.115]    
PBADMIN                                                   -  -  0.138  [0.134]    
EDUCATION                                                 -  -  0.136  [0.163]    
HEALTH                                                    -  -  0.133  [0.128]    
MUNICIPAL                                                 -  -  0.132  [0.151]    
MULTINATIONAL                                             -  -  -0.186  [0.399]    
FRANCE                                                    -0.116  [0.094]      -0.089*    [0.049]      -0.628***  [0.102]    
GREECE                                                    -0.021  [0.076]    -0.036  [0.042]    -0.016  [0.112]    
NETHERLANDS                                               0.033  [0.060]       0.076**   [0.034]    0.096  [0.088]    
Constant                                                   -19.382***  [3.147]     -13.035***  [2.120]    1.05  [4.370]    
      
ρ                                                    0.110  [0.142]    0.094  [0.241]      
σ                                                   0.820  [0.017]     0.847  [0.010]      
λ 0.091  [0.117] 0.080  [0.205]   
     
     
# Observations         [# Individuals]                      16,787 [3,365] 16,679 [3,364]  
Wald χ2(75)                                                        1,220.5***  3,787.5***  
LM(14)  test for omitted variables (COLS)  16.9 (p-value=0.258) 13.5 (p-value=0.485)   
Wald F(14)  for joint sig. of excluded  1.06 (p-value=0.356) 0.93 (p-value=0.527)   
Wald χ2(14)  test  for joint sig. of restrictions      30.34 (p-value=0.007) 
Wald χ2 test of independent equations 0.74  0.45    
       
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
The estimation method is maximum likelihood, with robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level.  
 
 
 
